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ASIA'S PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL HEALTH




This article provides a framework for thinking about Asian
approaches to and impact on global health diplomacy and
governance that might contribute to more sophisticated analyses
on Asia in global health politics, diplomacy, and governance. First,
the article examines the "rise of Asia" and "rise of health" as
overlapping but unconnected developments in international
relations. Second, it analyzes how the shift of power and influence
towards Asia, largely caused by China's and India's emergence as
great powers; affects global health politics and potential Asian
contributions to global health diplomacy and governance in the
future. Third, the article looks at normative ideas that characterize
Asian approaches to international cooperation and how these
ideas affect Asian participation in global health diplomacy and
governance. Fourth, the article considers Asian practices on
international health cooperation, which include bilateral relations,
regional activities, and participation in multilateral organizations.
The article ends with conclusions about Asian conceptualizations
of and contributions to global health diplomacy and governance.
An earlier version of this article was commissioned as a framing paper for the National University
of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy's Study Group on Global Health Governance
of the S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance, and will be published in an edited volume with
other papers commissioned by the Lee Kuan Yew School for this Project.
. James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, U.S.A.;
Member of the Senior Editorial Committee of the Asian Journal of WTO & International Health
Law and Policy. The author can be reached at dfidler@indiana.edu.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although global health diplomacy and global health governance2
have grown as topics of interest in global health and international relations,
the perspectives and roles of Asian countries and the Asian region in global
health diplomacy and governance have not been as frequently addressed.
Whether and how Asian countries have conceptualized and contributed to
global health diplomacy and governance are increasingly important
questions as Asia emerges as a more prominent region for political and
economic activities. Analyzing Asian perspectives of and participation in
global health diplomacy and governance is difficult because of the political,
economic, and cultural complexity of the Asian region and the quantity and
diversity of problems addressed through different diplomatic and
governance mechanisms. This article provides a basic framework for
thinking about Asian attitudes towards, approaches to, and impact on
global health diplomacy and governance that might contribute to more
sophisticated conceptual and empirical work taking place on Asia in global
health politics, diplomacy, and governance more generally.4
This article's analysis contains four parts. First, the article examines
the "rise of Asia" and "rise of health" in international relations. These two
1 On global health diplomacy, see Ilona Kickbusch et al., Global Health Diplomacy: The Need for
New Perspectives, Strategic Approaches, and Skills in Global Health, 85(3) BULL. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 230 (2007); Vincanne Adams et al., Global Health Diplomacy, 27(4) MED.
ANTHROPOL. 315 (2008); Harley Feldbaum & Joshua Michaud, Health Diplomacy and the
Enduring Relevance of Foreign Policy Interests, 7(4) PLoS MED. el 000226 1(2010) (the first
article introducing a PLoS Medicine series of articles on global health diplomacy); see also Ron
Labonte & Michelle Gagnon, Framing Health and Foreign Policy: Lessons for Global Health
Diplomacy, 6(14) GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH (2010), available at http://www.globalizationand
health.com/content/pdf/l 744-8603-6-14.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
2 On global health governance, see GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: CRISIS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
POLITICAL ECONOMY (Adrian Kay & Owain D. Williams eds., 2009); HEALTH FOR SOME: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE (Sandra J. MacLean et al. eds., 2009);
MARK W. ZACHER & TANIA J. KEEFE, THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: UNITED
BY CONTAGION (2008); GOVERNING GLOBAL HEALTH: CHALLENGE, RESPONSE, INNOVATION
(Andrew F. Cooper et al. eds., 2007); OBUIOFOR AGINAM, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN A DIVIDED WORLD (2005); and DAVID P. FIDLER,
SARS, GOVERNANCE, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE (2004).
For one analysis on Asia and global health governance, see Michael A. Stevenson & Andrew F.
Cooper, Overcoming Constraints of State Sovereignty: Global Health Governance in Asia, 30(7)
THIRD WORLD Q. 1379 (2009). In terms of individual Asian countries and health diplomacy, most
analyses have focused on China. See, e.g., Lai-Ha Chan et al., China 's Engagement with Global
Health Diplomacy: Was SARS a Watershed?, 7(4) PLOS MED. e1000266 1 (2010); see also
Yanzhong Huang, Pursuing Health as Foreign Policy: The Case of China, 17(1) INDIANA J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105 (2010).
4 For example, the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore
has supported a Study Group on Global Health Governance within its S.T. Lee Project on Global
Governance to analyze more closely how Asian countries conceptualize and contribute to global
health governance. See S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance, http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/cag/Stu
dyGroups.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
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developments are not often linked or connected, except when experts
identify health as a new, non-traditional security threat Asian countries
have to address or as a "global problem" strategies against which require
the Asian government involvement. Put another way, the rise of Asia has
had little to do with the rise of health as a foreign policy, diplomatic, or
global governance issue, and vice versa. However, Asia's growing
economic, political, and strategic importance is significant for exploring
how Asian governments conceptualize global health challenges and what
contributions Asian countries have made or can make to global health
diplomacy and governance.
Second, the article analyzes how the shift of power and influence
towards Asia, largely caused by China's and India's emergence as great
powers, affects global health politics currently and potential Asian
contributions to global health governance in the future. This power shift
has positive and negative implications for Asia's participation and place in
global health diplomacy and governance. How Asian countries view their
new power and influence will shape how they conceptualize global health
as an issue and how they approach global health diplomatic and governance
activities.
Third, the article looks at normative ideas that characterize Asian
approaches to foreign policy and international cooperation. The key norms
are the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Five Principles), first
articulated in 1954 by China, India, and Burma, but which have become
tenets of Chinese and Indian foreign policies and Asian regional diplomacy,
especially in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (see
Box 1). The Five Principles are: (1) mutual respect for territorial integrity
and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in
internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful
coexistence. The Five Principles apply to health problems as to other policy
topics, and, thus, are relevant for understanding how Asian countries think
about international cooperation on health.
Fourth, the article considers Asian practices on international health
cooperation, which include bilateral relations, regional activities, and
participation in multilateral organizations. Asian diplomacy includes health
in all these contexts, but the activities tend to be State-centric because they
utilize traditional, sovereignty-sensitive mechanisms of cooperation. Asian
countries have not been prominent in more innovative global health
governance mechanisms developed in the past 10-15 years. This review of
Asian diplomatic practices also considers some Asian-specific
controversies and the future of global health diplomacy and governance in
an Asian-centric international system.
The article ends with conclusions about Asian conceptualizations of
and contributions to global health diplomacy and governance. A key
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conclusion is that, to date, there is nothing distinctive about Asian
conceptualizations of or contributions to these activities. Asian power,
shared principles, and diplomatic practices have not caused or driven the
recent transformations of health as a foreign policy issue or the manner in
which global health governance has evolved over the past decade. The
article identifies some possibilities for a more pronounced Asian role in
global health diplomacy and governance, as well as highlighting obstacles
facing Asian countries, especially China and India, in blazing a more
Asian-influenced future for global health.
II.RISE OF ASIA, RISE OF HEALTH, AND MULTIPOLARITY IN WORLD
AFFAIRS
As many books, articles, and media reports have analyzed, the past two
decades have witnessed, simultaneously, the growth in political, economic,
and strategic importance of the Asian region and health's increased
prommence in foreign policy, diplomacy, and global governance. By and
large, the literature on Asia's new significance and the analyses on global
health's new importance do not overlap, meaning that experts do not
explain these phenomena as interdependent or even interconnected. This
observation has important implications for trying to understand Asian
conceptualizations of and contributions to global health diplomacy and
governance.
To begin, the lack of connections between the rise of Asian countries
and the unprecedented political importance global health has achieved
indicate that Western countries, especially the United States and European
nations, are the major force behind the transformation of global health as a
foreign policy issue and diplomatic concern.5 The increasing influence of
Asian countries in world affairs has produced debates about "Asian
values," an "Asian way" of policy-making and diplomacy, the "ASEAN
way" of regionalism, and contributions to international law of Asian
civilizations and cultures. Mahbubani and Chesterman, for example,
describe the "Asian way" of approaching diplomacy and governance as
having positive and negative features:
The positive aspects of this approach to diplomacy and
governance include respect for diversity, consensus-building
over conflict, pragmatic approaches rather than lofty principles,
and gradualism rather than abrupt change. The negative aspects
S.T. Lee Project Study Group on Global Health Governance, Overview and Guidance for
Participants of Global Health Governance Study Group Workshop (Sept. 2009) (on file with author)
(noting that the majority of contributions to global health governance have come from Western
developed countries).
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can be that the desire to avoid confrontation prevents
meaningful agreements being concluded in a reasonable
timeframe, or that the appearance of consensus merely masks
the true politics at work.
Discussions and debates about the "Asian way" of conducting
international relations have not involved much, if any, attention on Asian
attitudes towards health domestically or globally. As analyzed more below,
Asian countries have addressed health challenges during Asia's rise to
greater political and economic prominence, but these efforts at health
diplomacy have not produced or characterized the larger geopolitical shift
of power and influence towards Asia.
The lack of any prominence for health in Asia's political emergence
raises the question what Asia's trajectory of increasing political, economic,
and strategic importance means for health diplomacy and global
governance. In geopolitical terms, Asia's rise changes the structure and
dynamics of the international system, moving it away from the
quasi-hegemonic, American-centric, post-Cold War system into an
Asian-influenced multipolar arrangement in which China and India emerge
as great powers. This still-unfolding change in the international system
cautions that the transformations in health diplomacy and governance in the
post-Cold War period may reflect the system that prevailed during those
years. In other words, the changes seen in health as a political, diplomatic,
and global governance issue over the past 10-15 years are not Fermanent
and are unlikely to continue or reappear in the foreseeable future.
In the new, emerging system, international relations will reflect both
solidifying multipolarity and continued globalization. Put another way,
States will confront many collective action problems caused or exacerbated
by globalization, including health challenges, but producing effective
cooperative solutions will be harder in a multipolar system. The U.S.
National Intelligence Council characterized this more difficult political,
diplomatic, and governance context as potentially exhibiting "multipolarity
without multilateralism."8 This emerging geopolitical context means that
what China, India, and other Asian countries want will matter more in
terms of the international competition for material power and ideas, but
6 Kishore Mahbubani & Simon Chesterman, Asia's Role in Global Governance, presented at the
Global Redesign Initiative: Singapore Hearing (Dec. 1-2, 2009), at 6, available at http://www.wefo
rum.org/pdf/GRI/GRI-Singapore-Country-Hearing.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
See, e.g., David P. Fidler, The Challenges of Global Health Governance (Council on Foreign
Relations, Working Paper, May 2010) (arguing that the revolution in global health governance that
occurred over the past 10-15 years has ended and that the political conditions needed for more
radical changes in global health governance in the near future will not be present).
8 U.S. NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: A TRANSFORMED WORLD 81
(2008).
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Asian preferences might not prevail if opposed by other geopolitical
heavyweights.
Cooperation and collective action might only be effective on problems,
such as virulent and mobile infectious diseases (e.g., pandemic influenza),
where countries share strong converging, reciprocal interests in addressing
such common threats. More epidemiologically and politically complex
global health problems, such as improving the social determinants of health
(e.g., poverty, education, gender equality) within countries as identified by
the World Health Organization (WHO) Commission on the Social
Determinants of Health, 9 could face greater difficulties. In short, the
emerging multipolarity created by their rise to greater power and influence
might limit the ability of Asian countries to influence global health
diplomacy and governance significantly should they attempt to do so.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF ASIAN POWER FOR GLOBAL HEALTH
GOVERNANCE
The "rise of Asia" refers to the realization in international relations that
political and economic power and influence is shifting towards Asia. The
catalyst for this dramatic shift has been the sustained, significant economic
growth achieved by China, India, and Southeast Asia. One prominent
marker for this shift in power and influence is the decision to have the
Group of 20 (G-20) replace the Group of 8 (G-8) as the premier
international forum among the world's most important economic powers.
The G-8 had only one member from Asia (Japan), but the G-20 has five
(China, India, Indonesia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea). For global
health diplomacy and governance, this power shift has positive and
negative features that deserve examination.
A. Positive Features ofAsian Power for Global Health Politics
In terms of positive features, economic growth has contributed to
progress in Asia with respect to the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) developed by the United Nations (U.N.), which include
health-specific objectives (e.g., reducing the burden of HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria; reducing child mortality; and improving maternal
health) and goals on improving key social determinants of health, such as
poverty reduction, education, empowerment of women and girls, and
ensuring environmental sustainability. 0 For example, the U.N. reported
9 Michael Marmot et al., Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity Through Action on the
Social Determinants ofHealth, 372 THE LANCET 1661 (2008).
1o U.N., Millennium Development Goals, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals (last visited Sept. 20,
2010).
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that "[t]here was a dramatic fall in the poverty rate in Eastern Asia - thanks
in large part to rapid economic growth in China, which helped lift 475
million people from extreme poverty.""
The positive health implications of Asian economic growth do not,
however, owe anything to global governance institutions, instruments, or
initiatives specific to global health. Asian economic growth has occurred
because of, among other things, domestic economic reforms inside Asian
countries, negotiation of bilateral and regional trade and investment
agreements, foreign investment in Asian economies, and Asian
participation in the multilateral World Trade Organization (WTO).
A second positive aspect of the shift in power and influence towards
Asia has been that this transition has, so far, been peaceful. Previous shifts
in geopolitical tectonic plates have produced tensions, rivalries, and
conflict. Both China's and India's increased power and influence have
caused nervousness, suspicions, and some balancing behavior regionally
and globally, but, to date, this historic shift has not triggered war or threats
of war, which is good for global health given how devastating war is for
population and individual health. Asia has not been free of armed conflict
in the past 10-15 years, but the conflicts that have occurred (e.g., the
Indo-Pakistan conflict in 1999; the Tamil Tiger insurgency in Sri Lanka;
the Taliban/Al Qaeda insurgency in Pakistan; the Naxalite insurgency in
India) arise from problems that have little, if anything, to do with Asia's
growing geopolitical gravitas. But, the lack of armed conflict among
countries related specifically to Asia's rise has nothing to do with health
diplomacy or governance.
A third potentially positive feature is more speculative and
controversial but is still worth mentioning. As China and India emerge as
great powers, they may wish to compete more effectively with the United
States, Japan, and other powers in the "soft power" or "smart power" arena
of global health. Already, China views health activities as part of its
soft-power efforts in Africa. 12 Likewise, India incorporates health
cooperation as part of its efforts to improve political and economic
relations with African countries.' Multipolarity could stimulate more
competition for leadership in global health, with different national
" U.N., THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 7 (2009).
12 See, e.g., Jennifer G. Cooke, China's Soft Power in Africa, in CHINESE SOFT POWER AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES: COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD 27 (Carola McGiffert ed., 2009); James R. Hackbarth, Soft Power and Smart Power in
Africa, 8(1) STRATEGIC INSIGHTS (2009), available at http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/
publications/OnlineJournal/2008/Dec/hackbarthDec08.htmI (last visited Sept. 20, 2010); Yanzhong
Huang, supra note 3; Jeremy R. Youde, China's Health Diplomacy in Africa, 8(1) CHINA: AN
INT'L J. 151 (2010).
" Africa-India Framework for Cooperation, presented at India-Africa Forum Summit, at 8-9 (Apr.
8-9, 2008) (outlining cooperative efforts in the field of health).
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initiatives being created to include health goals or to address various global
health problems. Such soft-power competition could bring additional
attention, political capital, and economic resources to global health. The
potential downsides for global health politics would be that (1) such a
"health race" would continue to fragment global health governance instead
of contributing to a more consolidated strategy; and (2) global health would
become increasingly a policy space in which the great powers pursue their
narrow, national interests rather than support broad-based collective action
that improves health globally.
B. Negative Aspects of Asian Power for Global Health Politics
The negative implications of the power shift to Asia for global health
diplomacy and governance are three. First, the health benefits of economic
growth depend on such growth continuing, which, as the global economic
crisis of 2008 - 10 proved, is not guaranteed. Although China and India
have weathered this crisis better than others, it took a terrible economic and
social toll that set back achievement of the MDGs. 14
Second, the power shift means that multipolarity will characterize the
structure and dynamics of the international system, which, as described
above, might make effective cooperation on collective action problems in
global health more difficult. A soft-power "health race" among the great
powers would not necessarily produce effective collective action and would
multiply global health initiatives without an overall strategy. In addition,
the multipolarity that emerges might not be stable because rivalries could
develop (e.g., China v. United States) that result in political, economic, and
military resources being expended in ways that provide no global health
benefits.
Third, the growth of Asian power and influence does not eliminate
massive domestic problems Asian countries face, especially China15 and
India. To maintain their great power status, China and India might focus
more on their own serious domestic political, economic, and social
problems, including health, and not increase significantly their support for,
or take leadership roles in, diplomatic initiatives or global health
governance. Improvements in domestic health conditions in China and
India would, given the size of their respective populations, benefit global
health outcomes, but these improvements would not rely heavily on global
14 See U.N., supra note 11, at 4.
15 Chang-fa Lo, Values to Be Added to an "Eastphalian" Order by the Emerging China, 17(1)
INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 13 (2010).
16 David P. Fidler & Sumit Ganguly, India and Eastphalia, 17(1) INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 147 (2010).
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health governance mechanisms, with the exception of international
development assistance.
IV. ASIAN PRINCIPLES AND GLOBAL HEALTH DIPLOMACY AND
GOVERNANCE
Although Asia is diverse politically, economically, culturally, and in
terms of civilization development, Asian countries have exhibited solidarity
on basic normative ideas for participating in international relations - the
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The importance of the Five
Principles in Chinese, India, and Asian foreign policy, regional efforts, and
participation in multilateral forums is well known both historically and in
contemporary international relations:
Pan-Asian support for the [Five Principles] has deep roots in the
emergence of Asian societies from imperialism, and the Five
Principles have resonated strongly in Asia to the present day.
The Five Principles laid the basis for the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 and were reinforced
in the 1994 creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum on security
issues. More recently, the first India-ASEAN summit in 2002
explicitly referred to the Five Principles, and China and India
jointly celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the Five Principles
in 2004. Outside Asia, both China and India have used the Five
Principles to shape their relations with countries across the
Middle East and Africa. 7
Thus, the Five Principles constitute the normative framework Asian
countries, at present, utilize as material power and political influence move
their direction. Asian countries have given no indication that global health
falls outside the scope of the Five Principles. Thus, the Five Principles
remain important for how Asian countries conceptualize global health
diplomacy and governance now and in the foreseeable future.
A. Sovereignty and Non-Intervention
Asian emphasis on the Five Principles in global health runs counter to
trends witnessed in this area of enquiry over the past 10-15 years. For
example, support for a strong sovereignty principle clashes with many
arguments made in global health that traditional notions of sovereignty are
17 Sung Won Kim et al., Eastphalia Rising? Asian Influence and the Fate of Human Security, 26(2)
WORLD POL'Y J. 53, 58 (2009).
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an obstacle and that effective global health governance requires less
emphasis on national sovereignty and more attention to internationalized or
globalized governance approaches. In this regard, Stevenson and Cooper
argued that the actions of Asian countries in global health episodes - China
and SARS, Indonesia and avian influenza A (H5N1), and Burma and
HIV/AIDS - illuminate "sovereignty as an impediment to progressive
global health governance."' 8
Discourse on global health governance also contains frequent
assertions that States must be held increasingly accountable domestically
and internationally for their performance in health contexts. Such
accountability requires the ability for the international community to
scrutinize and, if necessary, interfere in the domestic affairs of States
unable or unwilling to protect and promote health effectively. This
increasing demand for accountability is connected with renewed efforts to
emphasize and strengthen the human right to health,' 9 but it is perhaps
most dramatically seen in the development of a purported new principle of
international law called "the responsibility to protect." 20 The Asian
preference for a strong principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs
of sovereign States stands athwart this movement for global accountability
of governments for health in their territories and opposes the principle of
the responsibility to protect and similar interventionist notions connected
with concepts of human rights and humanitarian imperatives.
Literature on global health governance also contains arguments that the
capabilities and authority of international organizations, especially WHO,
should be strengthened and expanded. Moving in this direction requires
greater institutionalization of global health policy and, potentially, greater
legalization through adoption of more binding rules, for example, in the
mould of the WHO's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)
and International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR 2005). 21 However,
applications of the Five Principles have, especially in the regional context,
demonstrated Asian preferences for weak institutions and utilization of
non-binding strategies and solutions. As Mahbubani and Chesterman noted,
the Asian "preference is still for consultative, non-binding forums that
avoid issues of national sovereignty." 22 ASEAN provides the best example
of this Asian predilection because this regional organization "is associated
not with sovereignty-reducing integration but with the "ASEAN Way": a
8 Stevenson & Cooper, supra note 3, at 1380.
19 See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, 22d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2000/4 (Aug.
11,2000).
20 INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS], THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT (2001).
21 World Health Organization [WHO] Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC] (2003);
WHO, International Health Regulations 2005 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter IHR 2005].
22 Mahbubani & Chesterman, supra note 6, at 3.
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process of consultation and consensus that is identified with many of the
cultures in the region."23
Another characteristic of global health politics identified in the past
10-15 years has been the increased involvement of non-State actors,
especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and philanthropies (e.g.,
Carter Foundation, Clinton Foundation, and Gates Foundation). Although
the Five Principles are not overtly hostile to non-State actors, they are
State-centric principles, embodying the belief that States remain the
primary interlocutors of world affairs. The activities of NGOs, especially
those engaged in human rights advocacy, and philanthropic foundations
endowed with substantial resources can be conduits for outside interference
in a State's domestic affairs. The Asian stress on non-interference through
application of the Five Principles creates a more skeptical view of
non-State actor involvement in global health than has appeared in global
health governance discussions elsewhere.
The principle of non-interference creates other potential problems for
Asian perspectives on global health diplomacy and governance. Many
global health problems stem from practices, traditions, patterns, and
systems embedded in countries, forcing solutions to require significant
changes to domestic affairs. For example, inadequately regulated economic
activities, such as lax biosecurity and biosafety standards in industrial-scale
poultry production, contribute to global health problems, including the
spread of zoonoses and antimicrobial resistance. Health-systems reform
25
- a leading global health concern - requires transformation of domestic
medical, health care, and regulatory arrangements in many countries.
Improving fulfillment of the human right to health often involves the need
for significant domestic policy reformation across the many policy sectors
progressive realization of the right to health directly and indirectly affects.
Similarly, addressing the growing prevalence of non-communicable
diseases in countries, such as diseases associated with tobacco consumption,
requires serious interventions within domestic societies. Reducing
corruption in order to achieve "good governance" - both important goals
for improving health systems' performance26 - involve alterations to
political and legal systems. Improving social determinants of health in
many nations cannot be achieved without transformations of aspects of
govermment and society, including the political, economic, and social
23 Tom Ginsburg, Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphalia, 17(1) INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 27, 36 (2010).
24 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, SUSTAINING GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE AND RESPONSE TO EMERGING
ZOONOTIC DISEASES (2009).
25 WHO, EVERYBODY'S BUSINESS: STRENGTHENING HEALTH SYSTEMS TO IMPROVE HEALTH
OUTCOMES - WHO's FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (2007).
26 Maureen Lewis, Governance and Corruption in Public Health Care Systems (Center for Global
Development, Working Paper No. 78, 2006).
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conditions that produce poverty, poor education, discrimination against
27females, and environmental degradation. Preventing and mitigating the
health-related impact of climate change will necessitate serious changes
within greenhouse gas-producing countries, including China and India.2
The principle of non-interference in the Five Principles creates
problems for global health actions required to stimulate reforms for
health-related challenges, such as those mentioned in the previous two
paragraphs, that are embedded in the domestic politics, economics, laws,
regulatory capabilities, and governing cultures of sovereign States. As
examined below, this observation does not mean that Asian countries avoid
international cooperation on these challenges; rather, it means that Asian
commitment to the principle of non-interference limits the scope of global
health diplomacy and governance on health problems tightly intertwined
with the domestic affairs of States.
B. Equality and Mutual Benefit
The principle of equality and mutual benefit in the Five Principles also
creates complications and problems for global health diplomacy and
governance. This principle harkens back to the unequal treatment and
exploitation many Asian countries experienced at the hands of Western
imperial powers. This unfortunate heritage makes Asian governments
particularly sensitive to political and economic developments that threaten
to treat them unequally or inequitably or that produce benefits mainly for
other countries.
This sensitivity has been prominent in the controversy caused by
Indonesia's stance on avian influenza A (H5N1) virus sharing and access to
benefits, such as vaccines, developed through research on such virus
29
strains. Concern about the unequal impact and benefits of patent
protection on pharmaceuticals, especially for developing countries,
required by the WTO and bilateral trade agreements also reveal this
sensitivity about equality and mutual benefit. The principle of equality and
mutual benefit informs China's and India's stances on climate change - the
Western, industrialized countries caused the problem and should take
greater responsibility rather than demanding that developing countries limit
their development prospects. This perspective appears in the Copenhagen
Accord negotiated in December 2009, which provides that developed and
developing countries should "cooperate in achieving the peaking of global
27 Marmot et. al, supra note 9.
28 Anthony Costello et al., Managing the Health Effects of Climate Change, 373 THE LANCET
1693 (2009).
29 David P. Fidler, Influenza Virus Samples, International Law, and Global Health Diplomacy,
14(1) EMERG. INFECT. Dis. 88 (2007).
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and national emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that the time frame
for peaking will be longer in developing countries and bearing in mind that
social and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and
overriding priorities of developing countries."o
C. Gap between Asian Principles and Thinking on Global Health
Diplomacy and Governance
These examples illustrate how Asian commitment to the Five
Principles complicates global health diplomacy and governance and reflects
a gap between the post-sovereignty mindset alive and well in global health
discourse and the post-colonial insistence by Asian countries on respect for
sovereignty and non-interference as fundamental principles in international
relations. The emergence of China and India as great powers in a
multipolar system has two additional effects with respect to the impact of
the gap between post-sovereignty global health approaches and the
pro-sovereignty commitment by Asian countries to the Five Principles.
First, as great powers, China and India will increasingly be able to
deflect criticisms of their domestic behavior and proposals for
health-related outside intervention in their domestic affairs. An example of
this ability to shrug off criticism can be found in China's aggressive
measures against influenza A (HINI), such as quarantines of foreign
travelers, which created controversy but which China sustained and
increased as other countries scaled back their responses in light of new
epidemiological information about the H IN 1 virus.
Second, Chinese and Indian commitment to the Five Principles will
shape their relations with other countries, which might prefer the Five
Principles-approach to more demanding, interventionist ideas prevalent in
Western thinking. As Cooke argued:
China's respect-for-sovereignty rhetoric still resonates for many
Africans. China's often expressed respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity and its policy of noninterference resonate for
obvious reasons with many African leaders. But they resonate
too with many Africans who view Western lecturing on human
rights, economic liberalization, and democracy as
condescending and hypocritical. The lack of conditionality or
broad consultation attached to Chinese assistance and loans
30 Copenhagen Accord, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the
Parties, 15th Sess., FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18, 2009).
31 Huang, supra note 3, at 140-45.
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allows projects to be implemented quickly, with visible and
often immediate results.32
The appeal of a Five Principles-based approach taken by Asian
countries, especially China and India, might force governmental and
non-governmental advocates for more serious domestic changes in
countries on the defensive because these countries can seek Chinese or
Indian support, which might respond positively to such appeals in order to
increase their soft power and open channels of political influence in other
countries.
V. ASIAN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICES AND GLOBAL HEALTH
DIPLOMACY AND GOVERNANCE
Understanding Asian conceptualizations of and contributions to global
health diplomacy and governance also requires comprehending how Asian
countries undertake health cooperation in their respective foreign policies
and diplomatic activities. Diplomatic practices can reveal wrinkles in
governmental attitudes towards collective action that suggest subtle
differences and possibilities not reflected in frequently expressed concerns
about power, sovereignty, non-interference, equality, and mutual benefit.
Asian countries participate extensively in diplomacy and collective action
on health matters, suggesting that Asian governments engage frequently in
global health efforts. This Asian participation in global health diplomacy
and govemance tends to be very State-centric through the predominant use
of traditional diplomatic approaches informed by the Five Principles. This
approach to international health cooperation and governance is consistent
with the general pattern associated with the diplomacy of Asian countries
in other policy realms.
A. Asian Participation in Global Health Diplomacy
Like global health governance, the practice of "health diplomacy" and
"global health diplomacy" has become an increasingly high-profile topic in
global health.3  Asian countries have addressed health issues in their
diplomatic activities in bilateral, regional, identity- or status-based, and
multilateral cooperative endeavors. In the bilateral realm, health diplomacy
and cooperation has featured in Chinese and Indian relations with Africa.
Sino-American and Indo-American bilateral cooperation include joint
32 Cooke, supra note 12, at 27.
3 See supra note 1.
34 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012), presented at
the 4th Ministerial Conference (Nov. 12, 2009); India-Africa Forum Summit, supra note 13.
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health activities. 3 5 Japan has staked a claim to being a global health leader
by increasing its suvort for health initiatives in its diplomatic activities
with other countries.
Regionally, health diplomacy and cooperation feature on the agendas
of numerous Asian regional organizations, including ASEAN, 3 7 the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, 38 the South Asia
Association for Regional Cooperation,39 and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization. 40 Asian participation in identity- or status-based
intergovernmental organizations, processes, and initiatives - such as the
G-8, 4 Organization of the Islamic Conference, 42 and South-South
collaborations43 _ also includes health issues. Table 1 contains brief
examples of health activities under these regional and identity- or
status-based intergovernmental organizations.
3s White House, U.S.-China Joint Statement (Nov. 17, 2009); White House, Fact Sheet: U.S.-India
Cooperation to Protect the Health of Their People (Nov. 24, 2009).
36 M. James Kondo, Japan as the Catalyst for Improving Global Public Health, JAPAN TIMES, Feb.
12, 2009, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo2009O2l2al.html (last visited Sept.
21, 2010); Keizo Takemi et al., Human Security Approach for Global Health, 372 THE LANCET 13
(2008) (commenting on Japan's use of the "human security" concept to strengthen its commitment
to global health). But see Sung Won Kim, Human Security with an Asian Face?, 17(1) INDIANA J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 83, 94 (2010) (critically analyzing Japan's use of "human security" in its
diplomatic activities).
" ASEAN, Health & Nutrition, http://www.aseansec.org/8611.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
3 Health Working Group - Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, http://www.apec.org/apec/apec
groups/som committeeon economic/workinggroups/health.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
39 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Health, http://www.saarc-sec.org/areaofcoo
peration/detail.php?activity id=1 I (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
4 Shanghai Cooperation Org., Joint Statement on Fighting Infectious Diseases in the Region of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=147
(last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
41 John J. Kirton & Jenevieve Mannell, The G8 and Global Health Governance, in GOVERNING
GLOBAL HEALTH: CHALLENGE, RESPONSE, INNOVATION, supra note 2, 115.
42 Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Conference of Health Ministers, http://www.oic-oci.
org/page detail.asp?pid=206 (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
43 Margaret Chan, Director-General of the WHO, Message at the Opening Ceremony of the
South-South Development Expo (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.paho.org/English/D/WHODGSpeech
SouthSouthGF09 eng.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
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Table 1: Health Activities in Regional, Identity-Based, or Status-Based
Intergovernmental Organizations Involving Asian Countries
Organization Example(s) of health cooperation areas
Regional Organizations
APEC * Health Ministers' Meetings
* Health Working Group (influenza preparedness,
HIV/AIDS, improving health through health
information technologies)
* Infectious disease surveillance
ASEAN * HIV/AIDS
* SARS
* Avian influenza A (H5NI)
* Influenza A (HIN1)




South Asia * Information sharing on infectious disease
Association for outbreaks
Regional * Sharing of health knowledge and expertise
Cooperation * Sharing of drug manufacturing capacities
* Adopting regional standards on drugs and
pharmaceuticals
Identity- or Status-Based Organizations and Initiatives
G-8 * Access to antiretrovirals for HIV/AIDS
* Malaria
* Tuberculosis
* Avian influenza A (H5N 1)
* Polio
* Bioterrorism
* Improving health systems
Organization of the * Polio
Islamic Conference * Malaria
* Tobacco control
* Pandemic and avian influenza
* Health equity in the Islamic Ummah
South-South * Health care delivery





At the multilateral level, Asian countries participate in
intergovernmental organizations important in global health governance,
such as the U.N., WHO (including its relevant regional offices), UNAIDS,
International Vaccine Institute (located in South Korea), the World Bank,
and the WTO. Asians have served as the WHO Director-General three
times in its history - Hiroshi Nakajima (Japan, 1988-1998), Jong-wook Lee
(South Korea, 2003-2006), and Margaret Chan (China, 2006-present). In
terms of WHO legal instruments important in global health governance,
many Asian countries have become States Parties to the FCTC," and all
Asian members of WHO are States Parties to the IHR 2005.45 In terms of
other high-profile multilateral efforts, Indonesia and Thailand were
founding members of the Foreign Policy and Global Health initiative
launched in 2007.46
In terms of more innovative global health governance efforts made in
recent years (e.g., public-private partnerships), representatives from Asian
countries participate or have participated as board members on the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria 4 7 and the GAVI
48Alliance. However, Asian countries have not, to date, become donors in
the GAVI Alliance, the International Finance Facility for Immunization, or
the Advance Market Commitment for Pneumococcal Vaccines.49
Although Asian participation in global health diplomacy and
governance is extensive, this level of participation is not distinctively Asian.
The growth of the political and economic importance of global health in
foreign policy, diplomacy, and global governance over the past 10-15 years
reveals that many countries and regions have increased their involvement in
global health as Asian countries have.50 As argued above, the rise of Asia
has not been linked with global health's increased diplomatic importance,
indicating that Asian participation in health diplomacy and collective action
has not been considered seminal to the transformation of health as a foreign
policy, diplomatic, and global governance issue. Nor does the level of
Asian diplomatic activity on health provide insight into whether Asian
4 WHO, Parties to the WHO FCTC, http://www.who.int/fctc/signatoriesparties/en/index.html
(last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
45 WHO, States Parties to the IHR (2005), http://www.who.int/ihr/legalissues/states parties/enl
index.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
46 Oslo Ministerial Declaration - Global Health: A Pressing Foreign Policy Issue of Our Time,
369 THE LANCET 1373 (2007).
47 Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, Board Members, http://www.theglobal
fund.org/en/board/members/?Iang-en (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
48 GAVI Alliance, Board Members, http://www.gavialliance.org/about/governance/boards/member
s/index.php (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
49 GAVI Alliance, Donor Contributions and Commitments: Latest Figures (as of July 2010),
http://www.gavialliance.org/about/donors/table/index.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
so G.A., 64th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/64/365 (Sept. 23, 2009).
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participation has contributed to the achievement of more effective,
equitable, and sustainable results for global health.
B. The Image of Asia as a Source of Global Health Problems
Rather than being recognized for heightened level of diplomatic
endeavors on health, Asia and Asian countries have been more frequently
associated with problems that challenge or threaten global health
diplomacy and governance. These episodes include Asian countries being
(1) the origin and epicenter of dangerous outbreaks, especially SARS and
avian influenza A (H5N1); (2) threatened by the continued spread of
HIV/AIDS, AIDS-associated sequela (e.g., tuberculosis), malaria, and
dengue fever; and (3) in danger from negative health impacts predicted to
be caused by climate change.
In addition, Asia has been the location for global health controversies
that are suggestive of the difficulties the rise of Asia might present for the
development of global health governance, especially concerning
application of the Five Principles. For example, Asian opposition to the
responsibility to protect principle blocked attempts to address health and
other humanitarian concerns Western States and NGOs raised after
Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar and the Sri Lankan government defeated
the Tamil Tiger insurgency. 52 Similarly, Indian, Chinese, and ASEAN
refusal to interfere in Myanmar's domestic affairs has allowed that failing
State to cause and exacerbate domestic and cross-border health problems -
HIV/AIDS, malaria, illicit drug use and trafficking - that undermine
national, regional, and global health.
Similarly, Asian support for Indonesia's claims of "viral sovereignty"
over avian influenza A (H5Nl) virus strains collected in Indonesian
territory challenged the legitimacy of WHO's Global Influenza
Surveillance Network, damaged global efforts at H5N1 surveillance, and
contributed to the establishment of a new intergovernmental negotiating
process supervised by WHO on virus and benefit sharing that has yet to
reach any mutually satisfactory solution. 54 As observed above, the
Indonesian stance and Asian backing for it reflected long-standing Asian
51 No Shelterfrom the Storm: Cyclone in Myanmar, 387(8579) ECONOMIST 78, 78 (May 10, 2008).
52 Asia-Pac. Centre for the Resp. to Protect, Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect:
Myanmar/Burma Briefing No. 2, (May 16, 2008).
5 Stevenson & Cooper, supra note 3, at 1384-89.
54 Aline Laboeuf, The Global Fight Against Avian Influenza (Institut Franqais des Relations
Internationales [IFRI], Health and Environment Report No. 2, Feb. 2009); Ian Scoones & Peter
Forster, The International Response to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: Science, Policy and
Politics (Soc., Technological & Envtl. Pathways to Sustainability [STEPS], Center Working
Article No. 10, 2008); David P. Fidler, Negotiating Equitable Access to Influenza Vaccines: Global
Health Diplomacy and Controversies Surrounding Avian Influenza H5NJ and Pandemic Influenza
HIN1, 7(5) PLOS MED. e1000247 1 (2010).
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concerns about unequal, potentially exploitative regimes and practices in
international relations. Yet, despite Asian support for Indonesia's position,
no other Asian countries have followed Indonesia's lead and refused to
share influenza virus samples for purposes of global surveillance for either
influenza A (H5N 1) or pandemic influenza A (H IN 1).
The clashing Chinese and Taiwanese perspectives on sovereignty
generated controversy and diplomatic problems during the negotiation of
the IHR 2005 that nearly damaged the negotiations severely.55 Taiwan
wanted to use the principle of universal application included in the IIHR
2005 to heighten its legitimacy as a sovereign State, but China refused to
budge on its position that it maintains sovereignty over Taiwan. The
China-Taiwan problem is not unique to global health, but the problem's
flare-up during the IHR 2005 negotiations revealed that even global health
is not important enough to China for exceptions to core claims of national
sovereignty to be tolerated.
Concerns about Asian attitudes towards human rights have also arisen
in global health. One source of these concerns was the controversial "Asian
values" debate in the 1990s that pitted assertions about Asian cultural
understandings of rights against more universalistic perspectives advanced
by human rights advocates and international bodies. Ginsburg has argued
that "[t]he greatest conceptual innovation of Asian states in international
law in the past several decades has been a regressive one, namely the idea
that "Asian values" offered an alternative to liberal universalism." 56
Although the Asian values debate did not focus on health, the debate raised
worries among those who believe that universal human rights are a critical
feature of contemporary global health politics.
Added human rights discomfort concerning Asia flows from the
weakness of human rights institutions and processes in the Asian region.
Unlike Africa, the Americas, and Europe, Asia does not have regional
human rights machinery. The nearest thing to such machinery is the
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, which ASEAN
established in October 2009." Not surprisingly, this new development has
been controversial, especially whether the ASEAN members really intend
to create a robust mechanism given their attachment to sovereignty and
non-interference in domestic affairs. The Commission has been called the
ss Huang, supra note 3, at 134-35; David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to
Global Health Security: The New International Health Regulations, 4(2) CHINESE J. INT. L. 325,
357 (2005).
56 Ginsburg, supra note 23, at 33.
s7 ASEAN, ASEAN Intergovernmental Comm'n on Human Rights, http://www.aseansec.org/2276
9.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
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"world's most toothless human-rights body"58 and "remarkable and. . . an
essential first step toward ASEAN's stated goal of respecting and
protecting human rights." 5 9 Although it is too early to evaluate the
Commission's performance, continued ASEAN and Asian adherence to the
principles of sovereignty and non-interference would make the eventual
development of an effective regional human rights regime doubtful. The
fulfillment of human rights relevant to health is, under the Five Principles,
a matter of a country's internal affairs in which other States or international
organizations cannot interfere.
China and India have also generated controversy in global health for,
so far, refusing to negotiate binding reductions in greenhouse gas emissions
as part of a new global agreement on climate change. China and India were
key players in the negotiation of the Copenhagen Accord in December
2009, a non-binding political agreement under which they and other
countries made voluntary commitments to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. 60 Assessments of the Copenha en Accord and its potential
impact on climate change vary significantly. 1 Failure to make progress on
mitigating climate change and adapting to the anticipated damage climate
change might cause could be a tragedy of enormous magnitude for global
health.62
Overall, Asian practices reveal significant Asian diplomatic
engagement with health issues bilaterally, regionally, and globally, as well
as Asian involvement in controversies that threaten global health and the
development of global health governance. Both themes are consistent with
application of the Five Principles in the global health context. The Five
Principles do not prevent Asian countries from engaging in diplomacy and
collective action and, through these engagements, contributing to global
health diplomacy and governance through bilateral, regional, and
multilateral efforts. As one analysis put it, "[t]he vast majority of Asian
5 Opinion, ASEAN's Toothless Council, WALL STREET J., July 22, 2009, available at http://online.
wsj.com/article/SBl0001424052970203517304574303592053848748.html (last visited Sept. 21,
2010).
5 Michelle S. Kelsall, The New ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights:
Toothless Tiger or Tentative First Step?, 90 ASIA PAC. ISSUES 1 (2009).
6 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference, supra note 30.
61 Michael A. Levi & David M. Rubenstein, Examining the Copenhagen Accord (Dec. 21, 2009),
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/21027/examining the-copenhagen-accord.html (last
visited Sept. 22, 2010); Robert Stavins, What Hath Copenhagen Wrought? A Preliminary
Assessment of the Copenhagen Accord (Dec. 20, 2009), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.
edu/analysis/stavins/?p-464 (last visited Sept. 21, 2010); Greenpeace, Greenpeace Copenhagen
Outcome Assessment (Jan. 7, 2010), available at http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/contentleu-unit/
press-centre/reports/greenpeace-assessment-COP15-07-01-10.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
62 WHO, PROTECTING HEALTH FROM CLIMATE CHANGE: CONNECTING SCIENCE, POLICY, AND
PEOPLE (2009).
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governments now understand that collective action does not erode, but
instead protects sovereignty."63
In these respects, Asian practices are similar to those of countries in
other regions, which have also scaled up their foreign policy and diplomatic
activities on global health. Asian countries appear, thus, to be reacting to
global health challenges, engaging in global health diplomacy, and
contributing to global health governance in ways similar to many
non-Asian nations. Locating distinctive Asian attributes in Asian
participation in global health diplomacy and governance proves a difficult
and potentially misleading exercise. To date, most Asian involvement in
global health diplomacy and governance activities reflects the Asian
preference for traditional diplomacy and collective action strategies that do
not create significant sovereignty problems or open the political doors to
outside interference with domestic affairs.
However, Asian countries' interpretation and application of the Five
Principles are not fixed and static, and Asian use of the Principles in the
future might not mirror their use during decolonization and the Cold War.
In those earlier periods, Asian countries deployed the Five Principles
defensively in ways that reflected their political and economic weaknesses
and their vulnerability to outside pressure and interference from more
powerful nations. Although prickliness over perceived outside intervention
still occurs, as seen in Chinese and Indian bristling over criticisms of their
human rights records, the stronger Asian countries, such as the Asian
members of the G-20, no longer equate, for example, economic
interdependence with threats of foreign intervention, as is evidenced by the
multiplicity of trade agreements these countries have entered.
Asian countries and societies have become more globalized through
their sovereign choices to access and integrate into global markets for
goods, services, technologies, and investment capital. The most dramatic
examples of profound change in this regard in Asia are China and India,
both of which for decades after World War II avoided interconnections
with Western market economies in order to pursue autarkic economic
development. In the early 21st century, China's and India's emerging
power and influence come from their respective rejections of autarky in
favor of deeper, more intense levels of political cooperation and economic
interdependence.
These dramatic policy shifts have also helped Asian countries realize
their vulnerability to many global problems, such as the spread of
infectious diseases, financial crises, and the dangers of climate change,
which require international cooperation to address effectively. The
globalization of Asian policy making makes many Asian countries less
63 Mahbubani & Chesterman, supra note 6, at 2.
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wary about collective action from the perspective of the Five Principles
than they were in previous decades.
Put another way, the Five Principles might operate differently as (1)
Asia becomes politically, economically, and strategically important to
international relations; and (2) attempts to articulate, advance, and achieve
Asian national interests take place in globalized contexts and thus require
significant diplomatic efforts at producing collective action solutions. The
stronger Asian countries might be experiencing what other rising powers
experienced in the past - anxiety about sovereignty and non-intervention
decreases in proportion to how a country's power and influence increases
in the international system. The United States experienced this shift as it
moved from a weak country's deep wariness and insecurity about
interference from the European great powers (e.g., the promulgation of the
Monroe Doctrine warning European countries to stay out of the Western
hemisphere) to a superpower's confidence about its interests and influence
globally. Historically, the attitudes of the great powers about sovereignty
and non-intervention tend to reflect what they want from other countries
and to embody less an unwavering commitment to these principles.
In that light, controversies involving Asian countries probably reflect
diverging national interests between other nations and Asian States more
than the application of the Five Principles by Asian governments. Although
the Five Principles are a distinctive feature of Asian approaches to
international relations, diverging national interests occur for many reasons
in global health and other policy areas. For example, the United States has
been involved in many global health controversies because U.S. interests
diverge from the national interests of other countries, but U.S. foreign
policy and diplomatic behavior does not embrace the Five Principles.
Caution is also warranted because Asian invocation of the Five
Principles might represent rhetorical cover for less principled interests
Asian States have for their actions, such as gaining or maintaining access to
markets or supplies of essential natural resources. Asian conceptualizations
of global health might not reflect the Five Principles as much as they reveal
the subordination of global health problems to other strategic, political, and
economic interests that Asian countries have. Such an outcome is not
limited to Asian behavior in global health specifically or international
relations generally.
VI. CONCLUSION: FROM PARTICIPATION TO GREATER
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ASIA
Attempting any synthesis of Asian participation in global health
politics, diplomacy, and governance is fraught with danger, especially the
problem of losing sight of the political, economic, social, and cultural
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complexity and diversity of what commentators call "Asia." Clearly, this
area of study calls out for more and better research and analysis than this
article provides. Nevertheless, however limited this article's analysis is, the
effort has produced some potentially interesting observations about Asia's
participation in global health diplomacy and governance.
First, Asian conceptualizations of and contributions to global health
diplomacy and governance show few, if any, features one could identify as
distinctly "Asian." The shift of material power and influence towards Asia
is moving the world towards a new type of multipolarity, which is a
systemic, structural transformation that is not "Asian" in any sense of that
concept. More importantly for purposes of this article, this shift in power
and influence has little, if anything, to do with Asian participation or
leadership in global health politics, diplomacy, or governance. Neither
China nor India - the two emerging Asian great powers - has been
identified as having been a global health leader in their respective
transformations into geopolitical heavyweights; and China and India have
emerged as great powers in spite of massive domestic problems that
adversely affect population and individual health.
Second, Asian commitment to the Five Principles affects the nature of
Asian countries' participation in global health diplomacy and governance.
These principles and Asian application of them are conservative compared
to prevalent themes in global health governance literature that discount
sovereignty and seek more international accountability of governments for
their health performance in their national jurisdictions. The Five Principles
are infused with post-colonial memories and attitudes and do not reflect
anti-sovereignty and post-sovereignty currents running through
contemporary global health governance debates. In short, approaching
global health diplomacy and governance through the Five Principles is not
innovative and does not account for the increased interest in global health
diplomacy and governance in world affairs, its differences from past
manifestations of international health governance, and its development in
the coming years.
Third, Asian practices in global health diplomacy and governance
reveal significant involvement by Asian countries on many issues and in
many diplomatic venues. However, as observed earlier, the same type of
increased and expanded participation can be found in non-Asian countries
and regions, which reflects the general increase in global health's foreign
policy, diplomatic, and governance importance over the past 10-15 years.
Actions by Asian countries that have caused, or been involved in, global
health controversies might reflect application of the Five Principles, but
they also might indicate that the national interests of States in global health
simply diverge, hardly something that should be associated with things
distinctly Asian.
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These preliminary conclusions do not mean that Asian countries have
little opportunity to develop more distinctive participation in global health
politics, diplomacy, and governance. Three possibilities come to mind.
First, China or India could decide it wants to become a leader in global
health, both through how it handles its own domestic health problems and
how it supports diplomacy, cooperation, and governance among nations.
This possibility would involve harnessing Asian power to advance the
cause of global health. In fact, experts have identified global health as an
area in which Asian countries generally and China specifically could show
more leadership. 64
Second, Asian countries could show more flexibility on applying or
appealing to the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and equality
and mutual benefits - or perhaps even carve out a global health exception
to the Five Principles. China has demonstrated some increasing flexibility
on its sovereignty claims to Taiwan in the global health context, allowing,
for example, Taiwan to have observer status at the World Health Assembly
in 2009. Another possible precedent is Asian acceptance of the
provisions in the IHR 2005 that subordinate sovereignty to global health
interests, particularly the provisions allowing the WHO to use
non-governmental sources of surveillance information, declare a public
health emergency of international concern - even over the objections of the
countries involved in the disease event, and issue temporary
recommendations that might have adverse political and economic costs for
66
affected States. However, any Asian global health flexibility within, or
exception to, the Five Principles would, in all likelihood, be quite narrow
because the potential for global health governance concerns to produce
frequent interference with domestic affairs is significant, especially with
respect to problems associated with the social determinants of health.
Third, Asian countries could focus more attention on making their
involvement in health cooperation more effective. In other words, Asian
countries could make sure their policies and practices in global health
include follow-up and follow-through so that commitments made have
positive impact on health. One frequent complaint about many health
commitments made in recent years, such as those made by the G-8, is that
the commitments are not fulfilled. Asian countries could aim to reduce the
gap between rhetoric and reality in terms of health cooperation in which
they are involved.
In this respect, Asian countries could begin this process by making sure
global health becomes part of the emerging agenda of the G-20's activities
on development at the G-20 summit in Seoul in November 2010. To date,
6 See, e.g., Lo, supra note 15, at 22-23.
65 Huang, supra note 3, at 136.
6 IHR 2005, arts. 9, 12, 15.
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G-20 meetings in Washington, D.C. (November 2008), London (April
2009), Pittsburgh (September 2009), and Toronto (June 2010) have not
addressed global health problems directly. The most likely place for global
health to feature at the Seoul summit is through the efforts of the G-20
Working Group on Development, which is charged with crafting a
development agenda for the G-20 for adoption at the Seoul summit.6 7
Whether the G-20 will embrace health in any way in its development
strategy remains uncertain and controversial.68 This state of affairs gives
something of a black eye to those who have advocated for many years that
health is and should be at the very core of development strategies. Efforts
by leading Asian members of the G-20 could improve the prospects for the
G-20 development agenda to include global health, even if such efforts do
not manage to put health at the center of the G-20 development strategy.
A number of obstacles would stand in the way of Asian countries
making a stronger and more distinctive contributions to global health
diplomacy and governance. To begin, multipolarity only means that
dynamics of international politics will change; it does not mean that China,
India, or other Asian countries will be able to do what they please. Thus,
multipolarity could blunt Asian power and act as a significant political
constraint on any Asian country or group of countries attempting to claim a
global health leadership role because achieving sustainable diplomatic and
collective action on matters important to the national interests of States,
especially the non-Asian great powers, might become harder.
China and India might not, however, have the ability to test
multipolarity's constraints on better global health diplomacy and
governance because they have to address large and growing internal
problems involving health in their own jurisdictions. The requirement for a
significant domestic focus might limit China's and India's interest in
making global health a lodestar of their emergence and interests as great
67 G-20, Seoul Summit: Agenda, http://www.seoulsummit.kr/eng/goPage.g20?returnurl=TOPOl
SUB03 02 (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
68 In analyzing the prospects of global health within the G-20, Garrett argued before the G-20
Toronto summit:
Reaching common ground on the global financial issues will be difficult, and if the
smaller (and wealthier) G8 cannot put its differences aside long enough to reach
consensus on the maternal and child health effort, the issue will definitely not be
entertained by the G20. Most of the G20 has already threatened to squash anything
that smacks of "mission creep," and the sole mission is economic growth. In a time
of shifting global power, the future of health and development remains uncertain.
Laurie A. Garrett, G8, G20: Questions for Global Health (June 24, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/
publication/22538/g8_g20.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2010). Similarly, Sridhar argued that "[t]he
real test will be how the South Korean government, the first non-G8 host of the G20, resolves the
tension between keeping the G20 the premier economic forum, thus not overburdening it with
health, climate change and the other major global challenges, and enlarging its mandate on
development." Devi Sridhar, Will Global Health Break the Back of the G20? (Aug. 5, 2010),
http://www.globalhealthpolicy.net/?p-141 (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
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powers. Improvements in domestic health in China, India, and the Asian
region would contribute much to global health because of the sheer size of
the populations concerned, but such domestic health advances would not
necessarily have to rely on or need global health diplomatic or governance
mechanisms.
More conceptually, the Five Principles, consistently applied, might
create sovereignty and non-interference barriers for strengthened collective
action on many global health problems deeply embedded in domestic
affairs, including non-communicable diseases, health system reforms,
human rights, good governance in health-related sectors, and improving the
social determinants of health. Asian countries might also use the Five
Principles to avoid disputes and controversies on global health issues in
their relations with non-Asian nations, such as those in Africa, in order to
maintain good relations, economic opportunities, access to resources, and
strategic influence vis-A-vis potential rivals.
Thus, the power, principles, and practices of Asian countries might
truncate the space for "global governance" and move global health politics,
diplomacy, and governance back to a more State-centric, conservative
mode of addressing international health problems. As Mahbubani and
Chesterman argued:
[T]he Asian style of consensus and consultation may fail when
confronted with the need for bold, collective action. Appealing
to the lowest common dominator produces wide, but not deep
commitments to change. The result is that many Asian want
change at the same time as wanting things to remain the
same . .. .The danger in such an approach is that decisions may
not be made, or that those made will fail to resolve fundamental
political challenges by putting rhetoric ahead of substance.69
How Asian countries and their various regional and other cooperative
mechanisms respond to the existing and future challenges of global health
politics, diplomacy, and governance remains to be seen, but one thing is
certain - how Asian countries respond will carry more political weight and
normative significance than at any other time in history of the modem
international system. Responding effectively to global health challenges
has now become Asia's burden and opportunity.
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